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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year hundreds of men, women, and children face physical abuse,
forced labor, sexual assault, rape, murder, and psychological abuse, each
act of which constitutes torture—in their own countries and even in their
own homes.1 These people are not tortured for political dissidence or by
oppressive governments, rather, they are tortured by entities very familiar to
Americans, such as Del Monte, Coca-Cola, Levi Straus, Gap, Pfizer, JP
Morgan Chase, Daimler-Benz, Ford, General Motors, Fujitsu, IBM, Shell,
1. See Elliot Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in a Global Economy, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153 (2003).
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Exxon Mobile, and the list could go on.2 The people who suffer torture by
their hands are often unable to pursue justice for the acts committed against
them because, rather than the perpetrator being a single human being, the
force behind the victims’ abuse is a corporation.
Torture is generally defined as any act directed against an individual
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted for obtaining information, intimidation, or coercion.3 Torture
by corporations may seem nonsensical, but corporations can be proponents
of and responsible for torture in several different capacities. Corporations
and governments may be in an official relationship, which often results in
the victims being shut out of the local courts by the government to protect
the corporation. One example of this type of relationship is a government
that provides forced labor for corporations to conduct their business, such
as the relationship between Adidas and China by which prison inmates
were forced to work for Adidas and beaten and poked with needles if they
failed to comply.4
Other times, corporations are simply providing enough revenue to the
country that the government chooses to look the other way and acknowledges the “costs” of doing business, namely the torture and abuse of their
citizens, which is more common in countries that have extraction industries
and need the corporations to use their technology to mine and provide profit.5 Corporations are able to use their economic power and influence in a
way that gives the government no incentive to regulate their behavior.6 This
type of relationship occurred in Nigeria between the Nigerian government
and the oil companies Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell, both of which
extract oil in Nigeria.7 Shell appropriated land for new oil pipelines without
adequate compensation for the Nigerian citizens, and the Nigerians began
protesting and holding demonstrations.8 Shell and Royal Dutch then allegedly provided weapons, vehicles, money, and logistical support to military
forces to attack local villages in order to suppress the protests, which culminated in the torture and rape of citizens and the deaths of many leaders.9
2. Id. at 159-60.
3. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006);
see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 19, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
4. See, e.g., Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2000).
5. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon an
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 92 (2002).
6. See Ian Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in International
Human Rights Abuses: A Progress Report, BRIEF, Summer 2009, at 45.
7. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 92-93.
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Corporations may also use government-provided security forces to
protect their investments. This is perhaps the most common situation and an
example occurred in Colombia, where a Colombian paramilitary group
bombed an entire town to protect the Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s
pipeline.10 In failing to regulate corporate behavior through judicial accountability, governments are essentially giving a green light to corporations to
employ torture.
Torture victims often suffer from prolonged or reoccurring pain from
injuries, severe “anxiety, depression, irritability, paranoia, guilt, suspiciousness, sexual dysfunction, loss of concentration, confusion, insomnia,
nightmares, impaired memory, and memory loss.”11 Congress recognized
the destructive consequences of torture, and in response to the epidemic of
torture, passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which provided
a civil cause of action that could be brought in American courts for torture
committed abroad.12 This legislation made it possible for victims to bring
over fifty successful suits against their torturers and achieve justice through
the American court system.13 In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit was the first
circuit to interpret the word “individual” in the TVPA as applicable to corporations.14 Other circuits, however, have interpreted the TVPA as applicable only to physical individuals and not to corporations, which is inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding and the TVPA.15
The position that the term “individual” does not apply to corporations,
taken by some circuits, leaves a dangerous gap in the legal accountability
for corporations. Since many host countries are unable or unwilling to regulate corporate behavior, and courts in “home countries” such as the United
States interpret statutes as not applicable to corporations, corporations are
left with the ability to act free from the rule of law. This Comment focuses
on the split between courts in the Eleventh Circuit and Fifth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits, and argues that “individual” should be interpreted as applying to corporations under the TVPA based on legislative history, case law,
and policy. Part II provides the history and elements of the Torture Victim
Protection Act and a basic introduction to corporations and their potential
liability. Part III introduces the disagreement in the courts about the inter10. See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009).
11. Canadian Ctr. for Victims of Torture, The After Effects of Torture, Nov. 2009,
www.ccvt.org/effects_torture.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
12.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
13. BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 76 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2d ed. 2008).
14. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009).
15. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d
14, 18 (D.D.C. 2000).
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pretation of “individual.” Part IV discusses why the Torture Victim Protection Act should be applied to corporations by looking at its legislative history, case law, and the policy implications created by failing to include corporations within the scope of “individual.”
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT

The Torture Victim Protection Act was first introduced in Congress in
1986 and was passed into law in March of 1992.16 The statute was passed
by an overwhelming majority in both houses and reflected America’s commitment to protecting human rights around the world by providing a forum
for victims of torture and extrajudicial killings to bring their cases.17 As
Congress noted, “Judicial protection against flagrant human rights violations is often least effective in those countries where such abuses are most
prevalent.”18 Based on this reasoning, Congress passed the TVPA to provide a clear civil cause of action in American courts for torture.19 The
commitment to the policy ideal of protecting human rights was coupled
with the holding of Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, which utilized the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) to provide compensation for the family of a boy who
was tortured to death by a Paraguayan police officer.20
Filártiga was the first case to apply the Alien Tort Claims Act, a part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789,21 to human rights violations that occurred outside of the United States.22 This case, and its revival of the Alien Tort
Claims Act, are fundamental to understanding the context in which the
TVPA was passed. In Filártiga, a seventeen-year-old boy, Joelito Filártiga,
was tortured and killed in Paraguay by a Paraguayan police officer. After
being charged with murder in Paraguay, the officer fled to the United
States.23 Joelito’s family came to the United States to try to hold the police

16.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
17. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 77.
18.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
19. See id.
20.
Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. The original act stated that the courts would have jurisdiction “of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350). The Alien Tort Claims Act now states, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
22. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876.
23. Id. at 878-79.
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officer accountable for Joelito’s death.24 The only way the family could
successfully bring an action for a tort that occurred outside of the country
and did not involve an American was through the Alien Tort Claims Act by
alleging a violation of the laws of nations.25 Torture had been recognized as
a violation of the laws of nations and was therefore actionable under the
ATCA.26 In finding for the Filártiga family, the court held that “deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the
nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and
served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides federal
jurisdiction.”27
Shortly after Filártiga was decided, Congress codified the case’s holding by introducing the Torture Victim Protection Act in 1986 and enacting
it in 1992.28 In the legislative history of the TVPA, Congress explicitly endorsed the holding of Filártiga and bases much of the TVPA on it.29
Filártiga held that “official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations[,]”30 and Congress referred to this holding when determining that prohibiting an action without providing a method of remedy is useless to the
victims of torture.31 In Filártiga, the plaintiffs first attempted to hold the
defendant responsible under Paraguayan law but after they were unable to
do so, came to the United States to hold him accountable.32 Congress took
this into account when they required that in order to use the TVPA a plaintiff must have exhausted remedies in the state where the torture occurred.33
The parallels between the use of the ATCA in Filártiga and the language of
the TVPA demonstrate the interconnectedness of the two statutes and Congress’s intent to make it easier for victims of torture to achieve civil redress
by providing an unambiguous statutory remedy.34

24. Id. at 878.
25. See id. at 880.
26. Id. at 878.
27. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
28.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992); STEPHENS,
supra note 13, at 77.
29. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85.
30. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
31. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85.
32. 630 F.2d at 878-79.
33.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85.
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B. ELEMENTS OF THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT

The Torture Victim Protection Act states the requirements necessary to
prove a violation under the Act.35 A potential plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted under actual or apparent authority or color of law of any
foreign nation and subjected the plaintiff to torture or extrajudicial killing.36
The TVPA authorizes anyone who has been subjected to torture or any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death to sue under the
Act.37 Courts have varied in whether or not to allow the legal representative
of a decedent to sue for torture, as well as extrajudicial killing, with some
courts allowing it.38
Although the statute seems to clearly state the necessary elements to
bring a claim under it,39 several issues have arisen in its application. The
first, and the subject of this Comment, is the interpretation of “individual”
and whether it applies to corporate entities. There is also the question of
complicity liability, which courts have uniformly held is applicable under
the TVPA based on its legislative history. Complicity liability includes
“persons who ordered, abetted, or assisted” in the violation as well as those
“with higher authority who authorized, tolerated, or knowingly ignored
[violations].”40 Complicity liability is relevant to the interpretation of “indi35.
36.

Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 states the liability to be:
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION
(a) LIABILITY.—An individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation—
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action
for wrongful death.
(b) EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.—A court shall decline to hear a
claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct
giving rise to the claim occurred.
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall be maintained
under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after
the cause of action arose.

37. Id.
38. See Cabello v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334-35 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (holding that the TVPA does not stipulate that only a torture victim has standing to
bring claim) But see Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1268
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (stating that an association cannot sue for a death under TVPA since the
association was neither the legal representative nor a claimant in a wrongful death action).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
40. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8-9 (1991).
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vidual” because if Congress had not allowed for complicity liability, it
would be more difficult to bring a suit against a corporation.41
The third issue stems from the requirement that actual or apparent authority or color of law of any foreign nation is shown. Color of law can be
shown through the hiring of state police forces to provide security, a foreign
official authorizing or directing abuses, or a government providing forced
labor to corporations.42 The color of law requirement brings questions about
foreign state immunity and the Foreign State Immunity Act; however, this
issue is not addressed in this Comment.43 The TVPA also excludes the
American government from being the state providing the “color of law”
necessary by requiring “color of law, of any foreign nation.”44 This may
have been to address political concerns by President George H.W. Bush
that the TVPA would be used against the United States military.45
Procedurally, the plaintiff must show that he or she has exhausted
available remedies in the place where the conduct occurred and that the
action was commenced within ten years after it arose.46 It is not difficult to
prove the exhaustion of remedies because the legislative history provides
that if a suit is filed in the United States it should be “virtually prima facie
evidence that the claimant has exhausted his or her remedies in the jurisdiction in which the torture occurred . . . [and] courts should approach cases
. . . with this assumption.”47 Failure to exhaust remedies is an affirmative
defense, and the defendant bears the burden of proving it.48 Since it is very
difficult to prove that there are “adequate and available” remedies where
the abuse occurred, and courts look to the legislative history, “failure to
exhaust remedies” is seldom successfully pled as an affirmative defense.49
Furthermore, the remedies must be adequate, not just available, which is
also difficult to prove. To this date, no case has been dismissed on the
grounds of existing adequate remedies where the abuse occurred.50

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
43. See STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 365, for a discussion of the Foreign Sovereignty Immunity Act.
44.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
45. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 79.
46. Id.
47.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9-10 (1991).
48. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 403.
49. See, e.g., Collett v. Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F. Supp. 2d
230, 243 (D.D.C. 2005).
50. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o the extent
that there is any doubt . . . both Congress and international tribunals have mandated that . . .
doubts [concerning exhaustion are to] be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.”).
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If the plaintiff is able to prove each of these elements, he or she is entitled to damages under the Act.51 The TVPA states that an individual found
liable “shall in a civil action, be liable for damages,” without specifically
stating which damages are applicable or giving a definition of damages.52 In
light of this, standard tort damage principles are applied under the TVPA in
order to determine applicable damages.53 The plaintiffs, therefore, can collect compensatory damages for all documented harms.54 Compensatory
damages are a factual matter that must be briefed and proven to the court in
a way that demonstrates the harm suffered by the victims.55
Beyond compensatory damages, plaintiffs can also collect punitive
damages.56 Courts have applied punitive damages to TVPA cases for two
main reasons.57 First, the legislative history of the Act indicates strong reliance and approval of Filártiga in which punitive damages were awarded.58
Second, the legislative history discusses the TVPA, not just as not a tool to
compensate victims, but also as a tool to eradicate torture altogether in
which punitive damages serve as a deterrent of the “heinous behavior” of
torture.59 For these reasons, courts have consistently awarded punitive damages when applicable for TVPA claims.
Substantively, in order to use the TVPA and receive damages under
the Act, a potential plaintiff must be able to allege torture or extrajudicial
killing. The Torture Victim Protection Act explicitly provides courts with
the definition of torture and extrajudicial killing as intended by the Act.60
The definition of torture adopted by Congress is identical to the definition
found in the Convention Against Torture,61 namely:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual . . . by which severe pain or suffering . . . whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as
51.
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)(1) (2006).
52. Id.
53. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 526.
54. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 203, 234-37 (2006).
55. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 526.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58.
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 199-200 (D. Mass. 1995).
59. Id. at 199-200. Although Gramajo explicated the justification of punitive damages, it failed to award them under the TVPA because the TVPA was being retroactively
applied to a situation that had occurred prior to its passage. The court discussed that retroactively imposing punitive damages may raise constitutional concerns. Id. at 200.
60.
28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(b)(1) (2006).
61. Compare S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2 (1991), with Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5, Dec. 10, 1984, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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obtaining from that individual or a third person information
or a confession, punishing that individual . . . intimidating
or coercing . . . or for any reason based on discrimination
. . . .62
Through this definition, Congress has recognized that, in modern society,
torture can take place through a variety of means and for a variety of reasons. Examples of conduct that courts have found sufficient to meet the
definition of torture include the following: electrocution in the genital
area,63 threats of death to family members,64 enslaving populations to
work,65 physical beatings and assault,66 rape and sexual assault,67 use of
violence to relocate villages,68 being stuck with needles and then denied
medical care,69 the use of electrical prods,70 and bombing an entire town in
order to protect pipelines.71 This is not an exhaustive list of all conduct that
could possibly constitute torture but rather an overview of some of the more
common allegations.
C. THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT

In order to discuss corporate liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act, it is helpful to review what types of liability are provided for under the TVPA. It is not only possible to hold those who directly carried out
the torturous acts liable, but also those who partnered with those actors.72
The TVPA uses several theories of liability in order to achieve its goal of
deterring torture,73 including the standard tort theories of joint venture and
agency.74 Liability extends to superiors who bear responsibility for the actions of their subordinates: “anyone with higher authority who authorized,

62.
28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(b)(1) (2006).
63.
Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
64. Id.
65.
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2001).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d, 35 Fed.
App’x. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
70. Id.
71. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
73. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 313.
74. Id. at 276-78.
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tolerated, or knowingly ignored those acts;”75 and “persons who ordered,
abetted, or assisted in [the violation].”76
The joint theory of liability is most often used against defendants who
enter into an agreement with a government in order to extract resources.77
“[C]ourts will find [liability under a theory of] joint liability where the parties: (1) intended to form a joint venture; (2) share a common interest in the
subject matter of the venture; (3) share the profits and losses of the venture;
and (4) have joint control or the joint right of control over the venture.”78 It
is easy to see how this type of liability, which is allowed under the TVPA,
would be applicable to a corporate-government relationship.
Defendants can also be held liable under an agency theory of liability.79 In order to prove an agency relationship, the plaintiff would need to
show that there was a manifestation by the principal that the agent could act
for him, the agent accepted the undertaking, and that both parties understood the principal was in control.80 Again, this theory of liability is very
relevant in the corporate context. If a corporation gives a government security force permission to do “whatever necessary” to secure an area, such as
an oil line or mine, and that security force, an agent of the corporation, engages in torture or extrajudicial killing, the corporation can be liable for
those actions.
In addition to the standard concepts of tort liability, Congress authorized three other forms of liability: aiding and abetting, higher authority,
and command responsibility.81 Aiding and abetting liability, although not
explicitly acknowledged in the statute, is inferred from the legislative history.82 The TVPA provides liability for those who “subject” another to torture.83 “Subjected” has been analyzed to mean “to cause someone ‘to undergo the action of something specified . . . .’”84 Therefore, courts have held
that “individuals who ‘cause someone to undergo’ torture or extrajudicial
75. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991).
76. Id. at 8; see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 779 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that aiding and abetting liability was proper under the TVPA); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
77. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 278.
78. Id. (citing W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 72, at 518 (5th ed.
1984)); Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
79. See id. at 276.
80. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 276.
81. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8-9 (1991).
82. STEPHENS, supra note 13, at 271.
83. Id.
84 . Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KWM), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3293, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002) (quoting the definition of “subject” in
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999)), rev’d sub nom., Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2010).
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killing, as well as those who actually carry out the deed, could be held liable under the TVPA.”85 Under this theory of liability, a corporation who
caused someone to be tortured could be held liable.
Higher authority and command responsibility liability are similar concepts of liability recognized by the TVPA. In order to prove these types of
liability, a plaintiff must show that there was a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander and perpetrator, the commander knew or
should have known that the subordinates had committed or were going to
commit the acts, and that the commander failed to prevent or punish the
acts.86 Although the wording of the requirements seems to apply only to
military leaders, courts have held that command responsibility applies to
civilian and military leaders alike, focusing “not [on] the civilian status of
the accused, but of the degree of authority . . . exercised over . . . subordinates.”87
D. CORPORATIONS

In order to understand the reasoning behind courts’ decisions on
whether to apply the Torture Victim Protection Act to corporations, it is
necessary to briefly examine what constitutes a corporation. A corporation
is defined as “[a]n entity (usu[ally] a business) having authority under law
to act as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it . . . .”88
To become a corporation in the United States, a business first must apply in
the state where it would like to be incorporated. States require filing of articles of incorporation, proof of bylaws governing the corporation, and may
also require out-of-state corporations to register in their state before conducting business in the state.89 By completing this process, a corporation is
submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the particular state and the United
States. The law treats a corporation as a legal “person” who has standing to
sue and to be sued under the law, distinct from its shareholders or owners.90
Corporations brought as defendants in human rights cases, such as
cases brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act, tend to be multinational or transnational corporations (MNC). A multinational corporation or
transnational corporation is defined as an enterprise
85. Id.
86.
Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002).
87.
Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1331 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (bringing suit
against the mayor and governor) (quoting Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999).
88. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 2009).
89. See CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., Corporations,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/corporations (last visited Jan. 09, 2010).
90. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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[c]omprising in two or more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which operate under a system of decision-making, permitting coherent
policies and a common strategy through one or more decision-making centers, in which the entities are so linked, by
ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them may be
able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of
others, and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources
and responsibilities with the others.91
An MNC usually has its factories in developing countries and then has a
centralized head office in its home country where it coordinates global
management.92
A corporation is more difficult to regulate because, although at one
time it resided in and did business in the country where it was incorporated,
today, a corporation can be found conducting business simultaneously
throughout the world.93 Multinational companies have as much, and sometimes more, power, influence, and money, as the governments in the state in
which they reside, but do not have the public law responsibilities of statehood.94 Many multinational corporations have budgets exceeding those of
the countries in which they are dwelling, which can put the corporation in a
position of power over the government, which often leaves the citizens unprotected since the host governments are eager to please the corporation.95
It is within this context that we begin to analyze whether or not corporations are regulated under the Torture Victim Protection Act and what bearing that may have upon corporate behavior.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Since 2003, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have consistently
held that “individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act encompasses
corporations as potential defendants.96 The Eleventh Circuit followed its
91.
U.N. ESCOR, Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 11th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 4, U.N. DOC. E/1988/39/Add.1 (Feb. 1, 1988).
92. Id.
93.
Binnie, supra note 6.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. In re Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala.
2003); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,
Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
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district courts when it initially affirmed this holding in 2005.97 The interpretation of “individual” was first presented to a district court in the Eleventh
Circuit when it considered Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., in which a paramilitary unit working for a Coca-Cola bottling company in Columbia murdered a plant worker, Isidro Gil, for union activities.98 The paramilitary
group then threatened the rest of the workers with death if they did not resign from the union.99 The union and the estate of Isidro Gil brought suit
against Coca-Cola and the bottling company through the Torture Victim
Protection Act.100 Coca-Cola argued that it could not be held liable under
the TVPA because the TVPA did not apply to corporations.101 The Sinaltrainal court rejected this argument and instead relied upon the legislative
history of the Act, which did not reveal a desire to exempt corporations
from liability.102 The court also looked at the word “individual” in other
areas of the law and found it was interpreted as applicable to corporations.103 The court then examined the relationship between the TVPA and
the ATCA and found that because the ATCA had been interpreted as applying to corporations, and Congress based the TVPA on the ATCA, it was
reasonable to conclude that the TVPA was also meant to apply to corporations.104
This holding was followed by Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co.,
in which the district court held Drummond Mining Company liable as an
individual under the TVPA.105 In this case, the two leaders of the union at
the mining company were murdered by Colombian paramilitaries employed
by Drummond Mining Company after the paramilitaries told the workers
that they were there to “settle a dispute [the workers] had with Drummond.”106 Following their deaths, a third worker assumed leadership of the
union and was removed from a bus on his way home from work and killed
by paramilitaries. All three men were involved in negotiations between the
union and Drummond.107 The court relied upon the reasoning in Sinaltrain-

97. Aldana, 416 F.3d 1242; see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303
(11th Cir. 2008).
98. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1350.
99. Id. at 1350.
100. Id. at 1349.
101. Id. at 1358.
102. Id.
103. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
104. Id. at 1359.
105. In re Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala.
2003).
106. Rodriquez, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
107. Id.
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al and held that the TVPA was applicable to Drummond as a corporation
for having a symbiotic relationship with the paramilitaries.108
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Rodriquez court’s holding in the
companion case, Romero v. Drummond.109 Romero arose out of the same
facts as Rodriquez, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
interpretation of the Torture Victim Protection Act presented in Rodriquez.110 The court held that “[u]nder the law of this Circuit, the Torture Act
allows suits against corporate defendants.”111
In Aldana v. Del Monte, union leaders at Del Monte were kidnapped in
Guatemala at gunpoint by a security force employed by Del Monte and then
hooded and told they were going to be killed.112 The security force members threatened to cut off the leaders’ genitals, threatened to burn them
alive, took their photos and told them that they wanted a clear photo of the
men before they killed them, physically assaulted them, and hit them with
guns.113 The court vacated an earlier motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and affirmed the prior decisions of the district courts to hold corporate defendants liable under the TVPA.114 In doing so, the court applied the
Torture Victim Protection Act to Del Monte as a corporate defendant.115
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, but certiorari was denied.116
B. THE FIFTH, NINTH, AND D.C. CIRCUITS

The Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have held that the word “individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act does not apply to corporations as
potential defendants.117 The first case to hold that the TVPA was not applicable to corporations was Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, in which a tribal
leader from West Papua sued the Freeport-McMoRan mining company for
human rights abuses, including torture.118 The mining company employed
108. Id. at 1266-67.
109.
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1315. Before this case had worked its way up to the appellate level, however, Aldana v. Del Monte had been decided and applied “individual” to corporations. 416
F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
112.
416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
113. Id. at 1260-61.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1265.
116.
549 U.S. 1032 (2006) (denying certiorari).
117. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D.
Cal. 2005), remanded by, 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d
14 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 35 Fed. App’x. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
118. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 368-69.
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security forces who were accused of: kicking villagers with military boots;
beating them with fists, sticks, rifle butts, and stones; starving them; making
the villagers stand with heavy weights on their heads; shackling their
thumbs, wrists, and legs; forcing victims to stand in containers up to their
knees in water filled with human feces; and detaining indigenous people
while taping their eyes shut, tying their thumbs, and beating them.119 Although the court acknowledged that the behavior constituted torture, it held
that the TVPA did not provide a remedy against a corporation.120
The Fifth Circuit held in Beanal that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim under the TVPA because “individual” could not be applied to corporations.121 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the plain meaning rule, which states that absent any contrary definition, a court must assume that Congress meant the ordinary, contemporary meaning of the
words in the statute.122 The court determined that the word “individual” did
not apply to corporations in its ordinary usage and therefore did not apply
to corporations in the context of the TVPA.123 The court also noted that
although Congress did not have the clear intent to exclude corporations, it
was not entirely inconsistent with the legislative history to decide not to
apply the Act to corporations.124
The Ninth Circuit adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit when it
considered Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., in which Columbian
citizens brought suit against Occidental Petroleum Company and its security force for a bombing that occurred in a village along one of the company’s pipelines.125 Concerned about security along the pipeline, security
forces dropped cluster bombs on the town of Santo Domingo and then shot
at civilians who tried to escape.126 Seventeen civilians, including six children, were killed, and twenty-five more were seriously wounded.127
The Ninth Circuit, however, expanded upon the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning when it determined that the TVPA could not be applied to corporations
in Mujica.128 The court’s discussion went beyond the plain meaning rule
and decided that because a corporation could not be tortured, it would be
inconsistent to find that a corporation could be a torturer.129 The court rea119. Id. at 369.
120. Id. at 382.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382.
124. Id.
125.
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009).
126. Id. at 1168.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1176.
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soned that the TVPA also uses the word individual when it describes torture
as being against an individual and corporations cannot be tortured.130 The
word “individual” must therefore exclude corporations at each place in the
Act in order to be consistent and avoid “absurd result[s].”131 This interpretation was upheld by the D.C. Circuit without any further explanation.132
C.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The Second Circuit has not taken a clear position on the interpretation
of “individual” in the TVPA, although it has been confronted with the issue.
In Khulumani v. National Bank Ltd., the court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to sufficiently plead facts to connect the defendant corporation with
the government in order to meet the requirement of acting under the color
of law.133 The court spent time explicating aiding and abetting liability under the TVPA but found insufficient facts to support aiding and abetting
liability and did not proceed to the interpretation of “individual.”134
Prior to this decision, district courts in the Second Circuit had held that
only individuals, and not corporations, could be sued under the TVPA.135
The Second Circuit did not cite to or rely upon the holding of any district
court cases in making its determination in Khulumani.136 Although the
Second Circuit has not explicitly recognized that corporations fall under the
TVPA, it is reasonable to infer that by discussing the merits of the claim, it
has, at least for the moment, left the door open for claims to be brought
against corporations as long as liability can be sufficiently plead. It is important to note, however, that as of September 2010, the Second Circuit has
held that corporations are not liable under the Alien Torts Claim Act.137

130. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
131. Id.
132. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d. 1080, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding corporations could not be sued under the TVPA after Nigerian citizens sued Chevron for torture and killings on an oil platform when villagers protested); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that “individual” did not apply
to corporations because of the plain meaning rule when plaintiffs sued Mobil for torture,
sexual violence, extrajudicial killing, and genocide in conjunction with building a new pipeline in Indonesia).
133. See Khulumani v. Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 317 (2d Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 318.
135. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 828
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 56 (E.D.N.Y.
2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
136. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254.
137. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876, 2010 WL 3611392
(2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
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IV. THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT IS PROPERLY INTERPRETED
TO INCLUDE CORPORATIONS
The Torture Victim Protection Act should be interpreted as applicable
to corporations as potential defendants. The Eleventh Circuit properly interpreted the TVPA as such, and its interpretation should be followed by the
other circuits.138 Applying the TVPA to corporations is supported by the
legislative history of the statute, case precedent, and policy goals.139
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Torture Victim Protection Act should be interpreted to include
corporations as potential defendants in order to be consistent with the legislative history of the statute.140 Although the legislative history never explicitly discusses corporations, it provides insight into the intent of the legislators and should be properly viewed as persuasive evidence in determining
the proper interpretation.141 The legislative history, including reports from
both the House of Representatives and the Senate, states a desire to establish a clear and modern basis for a cause of action for torture, a goal of deterring future actions by creating judicial protection, and did not exclude
corporations from liability.142 These three elements provide the basis to
include corporations within the scope of the TVPA.
1. Clear and Modern Basis
Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act in order to establish a clear and modern basis for bringing a cause of action for torture in the
United States.143 Before the creation of the TVPA, the only basis for bringing a civil suit in the United States against foreign defendants was through
the Alien Torts Claim Act, originally passed in 1789.144 The Senate wanted
to ensure that the ATCA could not be interpreted in such a way that would
take away plaintiffs’ ability to sue and seek compensation and therefore
passed the TVPA to clarify the United States’ position against torture and
138. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (2003), aff’d, 578 F.3d
1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
139. See In re Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D.
Ala. 2003); Ramasastry, supra note 5.
140. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84; S. REP. NO.
102-249 (1991).
141. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (discussing the use of legislative history as persuasive material for interpreting statutory law).
142. See S. REP. NO. 102-249; H.R. REP NO. 102-367.
143. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 87.
144. Id.; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4.
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extrajudicial killing.145 In desiring to create a modern basis for a claim
against torture, Congress looked to the destructive effects of torture as a
motivation for wanting to eradicate it.146 Senator Kennedy expanded, saying
that “[t]here are few actions so dehumanizing as torture. Victims bear the
physical and psychological scars of their experience for life.”147
Congress acknowledged that although virtually all governments have
outlawed torture, in modern society, torture many times does not occur by
direct government participation, but “many of the world’s governments
[indirectly] engage in or tolerate torture of their citizens.”148 The type of
torture that is “tolerated” by governments is often for the benefit of corporations operating in those countries.149 As governments compete against one
another to have corporations reside in their states, and thus to receive the
economic benefits that the corporations can bring, governments have little
incentive to regulate corporations’ behavior in their country.150
By recognizing the need for a modern statute that allows claims for
torture committed by nongovernment actors, or indirectly by governments,
Congress recognized the changing world of torture and corruption.151 If
corporations were exempt from this modern action against torture, this type
of modern torture that Congress sought to prevent would not be deterred.
Congress was aware that the torture they were trying to eradicate was not
always officially sanctioned by governments but rather tolerated by or
sometimes clandestinely engaged in by governments.152 Corporations can
engage in torture by funding government activities, such as security forces;
partnering with repressive governments in order to get access to natural
resources; or simply by taking advantage of the governments’ policies
without directly participating, such as being supplied forced labor.153
The Senate report also states that the TVPA was passed to make the
same remedies that were available to foreigners under the ATCA available
to citizens through the TVPA. Congress stated in the legislative history that
“while the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the
TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have
been tortured abroad.” 154 Given that aliens can bring suits against corpora145. Id.
146. See id.
147. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Foreign Relations (Jun 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy, Member, S. Comm. On Foreign Relations)).
148. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
149. See Binnie, supra note 6.
150. Id.
151. See S. REP. NO.102-249, at 3.
152. Id.
153.
Ramasastry, supra note 5, at 93.
154. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5.
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tions under the ATCA, it would be foolish to prohibit U.S. citizens from
recovering against corporations under the TVPA when the statute was
passed to give U.S. citizens equal remedy.
The new modern basis for bringing a suit stated that a purpose of the
TVPA was to permit suits against those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in
torture.155 Holding corporations responsible for their participation in torture,
whether through direct participation or by ordering, abetting, or assisting in
torture, recognizes the modern means through which torture is occurring
and fulfills one of the Act’s goals of creating a modern basis to recover
from and prevent such torture.156
2. Judicial Protection and Deterrence
By creating a modern basis for bringing a torture claim and thus increasing the judicial protection available for those who are the victims of
flagrant human rights abuses—specifically torture and extrajudicial killing—Congress has taken a substantial step towards achieving its goal of
deterring torture.157 Congress recognized that “[j]udicial protection[s]
against flagrant human rights violations [are] often least effective in those
countries where such abuses are most prevalent.”158 Congress passed the
Torture Victim Protection Act in response to this phenomenon.159 Congress
also noted, “A state that practices torture and summary execution is not one
that adheres to the rule of law.”160 A state’s failure to adhere to the rule of
law (or exercise the rule of law over a corporation) is called a “governance
gap,” and this is precisely the gap that Congress was trying to fill.161 Multinational corporations are not being held accountable in the states where
they are incorporated for their behavior abroad, nor are they being held
accountable in the states where they operate, due to the governance gaps
and the States’ inability to adhere to the rule of law.162
In providing judicial protection to citizens of other states whose governments are failing to provide them protection, Congress was attempting to
fill a large gap in the enforcement of the universal consensus that the rule of
law condemns torture.163 These countries where human rights violations are
able to occur are the same countries where governance gaps allow corpora155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 8.
See Ramasastry, supra note 5, at 93.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
Id.
See id.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
See Binnie, supra note 6.
See id.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
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tions to mistreat the population without fear of retribution from the host
country.164 If corporations were to be exempt from liability for torture and
extrajudicial killing under the TVPA, the TVPA would fail to provide the
judicial protection for victims that Congress explicitly sought to protect.165
Beyond the failure to provide judicial protection for victims of torture, failing to apply the TVPA to corporations also does nothing to deter future
torture.
The goal of judicial protection and compensation is not only to try to
make the injured party whole, but also to hold the offending party accountable for the harm, which will in turn deter potential future offenders.166 If
those who are ordering, abetting, or assisting in torture are not held accountable, and the victims are then not provided with judicial protection or compensation, there will be no deterrent effect on the acts of future offenders.
This outcome is not consistent with Congress’s purpose in passing the
TVPA, which was to provide judicial protection to victims of torture.167 As
Congress itself stated, “These universal [prohibitions of torture] provide
little comfort, however, to the thousands of victims of torture and summary
executions around the world.”168 By interpreting the TVPA to exclude corporations, the TVPA itself would provide little comfort to the thousands of
victims of torture at the hands of corporations around the world and would
be inconsistent with providing judicial protection to victims of torture.
3. Corporations are not Excluded in the Act
Beyond the explicit statements made in the legislative history that provide insight into why corporations should be included as potential defendants,169 nowhere in the legislative history or the text of the Act itself is it
ever stated that corporations are to be excluded.170 The legislative history
does speak at length about why the word “individual” was chosen.171 The
legislative history explicitly states that “[t]he legislation uses the term ‘individual’ to make crystal clear that foreign states . . . cannot be sued under
this bill under any circumstances.”172 This definition was written to exclude
foreign states from being sued, but not to exclude corporations. The legisla164.
165.
166.
(2009).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Binnie, supra note 6.
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
See 3 MARK P. ROBINSON & SHARON J. ARKIN, LITIGATING TORTS CASES §28:22
See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
Id.
See id. at 8.
See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8.
See id.
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tive history also discusses excluding the American military, again explicitly
delineating those who are to be excluded. This demonstrates that Congress
was perfectly capable of stating who was to be excluded from the Act and
did so in its discussion of foreign states, but did not exempt corporations.173
Congress also stated that it was creating an “unambiguous” cause of action,174 one which specifically excluded those actors who were to be excluded and did not exclude those who were not to be excluded.175
In refusing to explicitly exclude corporations, Congress used terms in
the Act that implicitly include corporations.176 For example, the law is to
create a cause of action against anyone who “subjects any individual to
torture or extrajudicial killing.”177 Corporations are capable of “subjecting”
an individual to torture, as seen in Unocal, when a corporation employed
Myanmar military forces to forcibly obtain property and then guard that
property for a new oil pipeline.178 The Myanmar military used physical
assault, rape, and torture in carrying out their job, which the corporation
knew about as emails were presented in which corporate officers discussed
the best way to avoid bad publicity in conjunction with the military’s behavior.179 The aiding and abetting liability provided in the legislative history
of the Act makes it possible to see how a corporation, such as Unocal, could
be found to be within the scope of the TVPA.180 Furthermore, while not
using the word “individual” in the statute and legislative history, Congress
chose words that encompass corporations, such as “torturers,” “human
rights oppressors,” and “human rights violators.”181 This wording shows no
intent or attempt to exclude corporations from liability.
Since Congress did not explicitly exclude corporations in the legislative history or the Act, it is helpful to look at the case in the legislative history that Congress was explicitly relying on in drafting the statute, Filártiga
v. Pena-Irala.182 The decision in Filártiga came down in 1980 and held that
torture violated the laws of nations.183 Following the Filártiga decision but
before the enactment of the TVPA in 1991, several cases were brought un173. Id.; see also Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (holding that if Congress had
wanted to exempt corporations, then it would have done so explicitly).
174. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4.
175. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1267 (N.D.
Ala. 2003).
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
178. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
179. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 939.
180. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
181. See S. REP. NO. 102-249; 135 CONG. REC. 6,423 (1989).
182. See S. REP. NO. 102-249; see also Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir.
1980).
183. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
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der the Alien Tort Claims Act against corporations.184 It is reasonable to
conclude that Congress would have examined the precedent that Filártiga,
a case they relied upon to make new law, had set before passing a new law.
If in examining Filártiga’s progeny, Congress had been dissatisfied with its
application to corporations, it would have explicitly created an exception,
like it did for foreign states. It did not create such exception.
The legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection Act was properly considered and interpreted when the Eleventh Circuit determined that
the TVPA can be applied to corporations.185 The legislative history demonstrates Congress’s intent to create a modern basis for bringing suit, provides
a source of judicial protection and deterrence, and its purposefulness in not
excluding corporations from the Act.186 Each of these three goals supports
including corporations within the scope of “individuals.”
B. CASE PRECEDENT

Case precedent is relevant in two ways when considering the proper
interpretation of the Torture Victim Protection Act. First, cases interpreting
laws in other contexts regarding “individual” can provide clarification of
the proper interpretation of “individual” in the TVPA. Further, cases interpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act, both before and after the TVPA passed,
provide insight into the TVPA because it was written to codify the holding
of an ATCA case.
1. Cases Interpreting “Individual”
Case law that is not progeny of Filártiga or interpreting the Torture
Victim Protection Act is helpful to determine the proper definition of the
word “individual.” Courts have relied upon case law to interpret “individual” to include corporations and to exclude corporations. Courts throughout
American jurisprudence have interpreted “individual” in varying ways with
respect to corporations.187 As a result, the word “individual” itself is not
determinative of whether corporations are within the scope of the TVPA. It
should, though, be very persuasive that the Supreme Court has held “indi184. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989);
Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
185. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d,
578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
186. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 (1991); S. REP. NO. 102-249.
187. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that “individual” is applicable to corporations); In re Goodman, 991 F.2d 613, 619 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that “individual” cannot encompass corporations).
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vidual” as applicable to corporations in other areas of the law.188 The argument of this Comment, therefore, does not apply a new definition to “individual,” but rather takes the definition from instances in other areas of the
law and applies it to the TVPA.
As far back as 1880, long before the passing of the Torture Victim
Protection Act, “individual” was interpreted in contract law to apply to corporations.189 The Ohio Supreme Court held that “[t]he word ‘individual’ is
here used in the sense of person, and embraces artificial or corporate persons as well as natural.”190 This early interpretation supports the proposition
that Congress knew that “individual” could be applied to corporations, and
chose the word “individual” with that knowledge.
In 1985, also prior to the passing of the Torture Victim Protection Act,
the Fourth Circuit held that although Congress used the word “individual”
when drafting the Bankruptcy Code, “individual” was applicable to corporations.191 In coming to this determination, the court looked at the legislative history and statute and found that “[a] reading of that subsection suggests no basis for such a narrow construction.”192 This construction was
affirmed by several cases, including a case in the Third Circuit in 1990,
prior to the passing of the TVPA.193 The Third Circuit held that “[a]lthough
Section 362(h) refers to an individual, the section has uniformly been held
to be applicable to a corporate debtor.”194 These cases demonstrate that “individual” can be applicable to corporations and was interpreted as such
prior to the passing of the TVPA.
The Supreme Court affirmed that “individual” may include corporations when it held that “individual” is capable of having broad application,
including corporations.195 United States v. Clinton involved the interpretation of a congressional statute that used the word “individual” to grant
standing to challenge the statute. The Court held that Congress intended to
use “individual” in a broad sense, such as synonymous with “person,” a
word that encompasses corporations.196 The Court noted that “Congress
undoubtedly intended the word ‘individual’ to be construed as synonymous
with the word ‘person,’”197 and “it is clear that Congress meant that word to
188. See Clinton, 524 U.S. 417.
189. State ex rel. Am. Union Tel. Co. v. Bell Tel. Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 310 (1880).
190. Id.
191. In re Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc., 50 Bank. Rep. 250, 254 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1985).
192. Id.
193. See In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990).
194. Id.
195. See City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
196. Id. at 428.
197. Id.
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be construed broadly to include corporations and other entities.”198 Clinton
explicitly holds that the legislative history of an act or statute can affect the
interpretation of the words therein, beyond the “plain meaning rule.”199 As
previously discussed, the legislative history of the TVPA supports the interpretation of “individual” as applying to corporations.200
Following Clinton, the Ninth Circuit interpreted “individual” to include corporations in the context of criminal law, because the plain meaning of “individual” does not exclude corporations in the context of the criminal code.201 The Ninth Circuit relied upon dictionary definitions from both
Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary, which both state that
“individual” can include artificial persons, such as corporations.202 The
court also examined the context in which “individual” was used and found
that it must include corporations to avoid an unjust result.203 A reliance on
this reasoning would lead “individual” to be interpreted as including corporations in the TVPA, both because the Fifth Circuit has held that “individual” does not explicitly exclude corporations, and because the failure to include a corporation as an “individual” would lead to an unjust result, since
victims of corporate torture would not receive justice.
Most recently, the Supreme Court considered the potential difference
between corporations and “individuals” in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a case that interpreted campaign finance law.204 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court did not interpret “individual” but determined whether a campaign finance restriction law, which differentiated
between “individuals” as singular human beings and “corporations,” was
constitutional under the First Amendment.205 The Court held that “[t]he
association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at
least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is
not ‘an individual American,’”206 thus rejecting the difference in treatment
between an “individual” and a “corporation.” Further, the “text [of the First
Amendment] offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker,
from single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated
associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals
. . . .”207 The Court rejected the idea that “individual” is incompatible with
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 417.
Id. at 429.
See supra Part IV.A.
See United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
See id.
See id. at 928.
Id. at 929.

2010]

TORTURE, INC.

199

“corporation.”208 In doing so, the Court’s interpretation did not foreclose
the application of “individual” to corporations under the TVPA.
The jurisprudence on the interpretation of “individual” does not concretely support excluding or including corporations.209 As a result, courts
are not able to confidently state that in giving “individual” its plain meaning, it does not apply to corporations.210 If this were the case, and those
circuits were indeed correct, there would not be the mixed interpretation
that is found in the case law. Interpreting “individual” to include corporations is not a new concept in American jurisprudence as it has already been
done in numerous other areas of the law. Since there is no clear “ordinary
usage,” courts must then look to the legislative history, public policy, and
other contexts surrounding the statute in order to interpret “individual” in a
way that avoids unjust results.211 In the context of the Torture Victim Protection Act, this would lead courts to interpret “individual” as applicable to
corporations.
2. Cases Interpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act
The Torture Victim Protection Act was passed to codify the holding of
Filártiga, a case that was brought under the Alien Torts Claim Act.212 As
such, in order to determine the scope of the TVPA, it is useful to look at
federal cases which interpreted the ATCA and Filártiga, that were decided
before the TVPA was enacted. Three years before the passing of the TVPA
the Fifth Circuit decided Carmichael v. United Technology Corp.213 In
Carmichael, a British national brought suit in Texas against several corporations under the ATCA after being tortured and imprisoned in Saudi Arabia.214 The court dismissed the majority of the claims due to insufficient
service of process to the corporations under Texas law.215 The Fifth Circuit
then dismissed the remaining claims against the corporation because the
plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that the corporation
should be held liable for torture or imprisonment under the “aiding and abetting” theory of liability.216
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998); In re Goodman, 991
F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993).
210. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that in applying the word
“individual’s” ordinary meaning, it does not include corporations).
211. See Clinton, 524 U.S. 417.
212. See Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
213. Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988).
214. Id. at 111.
215. Id. at 111-12.
216. Id. at 114-15.
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It is most important to note, however, that the Fifth Circuit did not
hold that corporations were outside of the scope of liability under Filártiga
or under the ATCA, but instead debated the merits of the claim being
brought.217 This case was decided years before the TVPA was passed and
suggests that a corporation could be a potential defendant in an ATCA case
that specifically alleges torture. Carmichael, which applied the ATCA to
corporations, was part of the Filártiga progeny that was codified by Congress in the TVPA.218
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with this issue again in Jones v. Petty
Ray Geophysical Geosource, when a suit was brought to recover for an
incident where rebels in Sudan killed a Texas man, Jones, in a mineral exploration operation.219 Jones’ family brought suit under the ATCA against
the country of Sudan and the mining company in charge of the operation.220
In 1989, the court dismissed the claims against Sudan but allowed the
claims against the corporation to proceed.221 Later in the litigation—after
the TVPA was passed, but not based on the TVPA—the claims against the
corporation were dismissed for a failure to allege sufficient causation and
lack of jurisdiction.222 However, once again, the court implicitly held in a
post-Filártiga, pre-TVPA case that claims of torture and extrajudicial killing were actionable against corporate defendants.223 These cases provide
two examples of actions brought against corporations before the TVPA was
passed and support the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the TVPA as
applicable to corporations.
Given the legislative history of the TVPA, which states that Congress
sought to provide the same remedies that are available to foreign citizens
under the ATCA to American citizens through the TVPA,224 it is persuasive
to look at Alien Tort Claim Act cases that were adjudicated after the passing of the Torture Victim Protection Act. By reviewing how those cases
treated corporations, it will provide insight into what would be an appropriate reciprocal approach under the TVPA for American citizens.
In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., the Ninth Circuit dismissed
the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPA against Occidental Petroleum Com217. See id. at 109.
218. See Carmichael, 835 F.2d at 109.
219. Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Tex.
1989).
220. Id. at 344.
221. Id. at 349.
222.
The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiff was an American, and the ATCA applies only to aliens. Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc.,
954 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1992). The TVPA remedied this situation by providing relief for
United States citizens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
223. See Jones, 954 F.2d 1061.
224. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
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pany for injuries and deaths caused by the bombing of an entire Colombian
town along a pipeline.225 In the same decision, however, the court upheld
the plaintiffs’ claims against the corporation under the ATCA.226 By this
logic, an American injured or killed in the bombing would not be able to
file suit against the corporation because Americans can not recover under
the ATCA, only the TVPA, but a Colombian injured or killed in the bombing can recover under the ATCA. This leads to absurd results, especially
considering the TVPA’s goal of providing the same protections to Americans that are available to foreign citizens.227
In Wiwa v. Dutch Petroleum,228 Nigerian plaintiffs who protested the
building of a new oil pipeline were raped, beaten, and tortured.229 These
actions culminated with the mock trial of Ken Wiwa and his execution at
the behest of Dutch Petroleum and Shell Oil.230 The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and did not question whether the corporations
could be sued under the ATCA.231 After denying the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Shell finally settled the case in exchange for the plaintiffs dismissing their claims.232 As evident again, the application of the logic of those
circuits that deem “individual” as not applying to corporations leads to absurd results. If Wiwa had been an American protesting in Nigeria, he would
have been unable to recover as a plaintiff under the ATCA because it is
limited to foreign plaintiffs. Yet, this American plaintiff also would not be
able to recover under the TVPA because the instigator was a corporation.
This result is directly opposed to congressional intent.233
Until September of 2010, no claim filed under the ATCA had ever
been dismissed simply because the defendant was a corporation. The interplay between the ATCA and the TVPA leads to nonsensical results if “individual” does not encompass corporations under the TVPA as well.234 In
225.
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
226. Id. at 1183.
227. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5.
228.
Wiwa v. Dutch Petroleum, 626 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
229.
Complaint at 2, Wiwa v. Dutch Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386(KWM), 2002 WL
319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
230. Id.
231. See Wiwa, 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 386-88 (discussing claims against the corporations without discussing whether corporations can be sued).
232. Shell Settles Wiwa Case with Humanitarian Gesture, Aug. 8, 2009,
http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/archive/2009/shell_set
tlement_wiwa_case_08062009.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
233. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
234. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' Claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act, Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C99-02506 SI), 2006 WL
1050618.
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September 2010, however, the Second Circuit dismissed an ATCA claim
where Royal Dutch Petroleum was named as a defendant.235 The court held
that because claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act are to be determined
by customary norms of international law, and customary international law
does not appear to hold corporations liable as an actor, a corporation cannot
be sued under the ATCA.236 This analysis, regardless of its potential accuracy or inaccuracy, is moot when applied to the TVPA because the TVPA
requires “color of law.” This “color of law” requirement moves the action
from a purely private corporate act, to that of a state act, which is an area
unquestionably regulated by international law.237 In examining the case law,
no precedent refuses to include corporations within the term “individual,”
while there is substantial precedent, including cases examining the ATCA,
which suggests that it should.
C. POLICY RATIONALE

“Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned; they therefore do as they like.”238
- Edward Thurlow, 1st Baron Thurlow (18th Century)
Because there lacks domestic and international laws that specifically
govern corporations, a governance gap has opened that allows corporations
to act without legal accountability. The existence of this governance gap
harms those in the weakest positions—citizens of developing countries.239
There are strong policy reasons for home states to encourage corporate cultures to be respectful of human rights extraterritorially. Additionally, home
states have a responsibility to discourage abuses and to hold corporations
accountable for human rights abuse abroad.240 In order for states to successfully fulfill their duty to protect against the abuse of nonstate third parties,
victims need to have greater access to judicial remedies.241 The Torture
Victim Protection Act would fill this gap if properly interpreted to include
corporations within its scope of liability. In doing so, the Act also would
represent an attempt by a home state, the United States, to assert jurisdiction over MNCs and influence their behavior abroad.242 Furthermore, the
235. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876, 2010 WL 3611392
(2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
236. See id. at *2.
237.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
238. JOHN POYNDER, LITERARY EXTRACTS 2 (1st vol. 1844).
239. See Binnie, supra note 6.
240.
Sarah Altschuller & Amy Lehr, Corporate Social Responsibility, 43 INT’L LAW.
577, 578 (2009).
241. Id. at 579.
242.
Ramasastry, supra note 5, at 92.
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United States’ obligation under preexisting international laws requires that
the United States provide a judicial forum for victims of torture.
1. Filling the Governance Gaps
Corporations, and the ethical and legal dilemmas that accompany
them, are not a new problem confronting society. The problem, however,
has changed since communication technology has improved and corporations no longer reside entirely under the regulatory purview of one country.
Because corporations now operate in multiple countries, it is unclear which
country has the authority to regulate their behavior—this creates governance gaps.243 Many corporations have annual income exceeding that of the
countries in which they are located, such as Exxon, BP, and Royal Dutch
Shell.244 Corporations also own more than eighty percent of the world’s
financial investment, which puts them in a strong position of power.245 In
order to address corporate abuse and fill the gaps in governance, host countries need to embrace their state duty to protect against human rights abuses
committed by corporate third parties. In order to bolster this responsibility,
victims need more effective access to remedies.246
Imposing a state duty to protect against human rights violations by
third parties in host countries may seem easy; however, forcing the host
countries to enforce that legislation is challenging. Many of the decisions
made by a multinational corporation regarding strategy in a developing
country are not made within that country, but rather are made in the boardrooms in the corporation’s home country.247 The host government is then
presented with an already formulated plan rather than being involved at the
collaboration process, and is faced with a dilemma between protecting its
citizens’ health and welfare and acquiescing to the interests of the MNC.248
Often times when a host government tries to negotiate with the MNC about
243. See Binnie, supra note 6.
244.
Rhett A. Butler, Corporations Among Largest Global Entities, July 2005,
http://news.mongabay.com/2005/0718-worlds_largest.html (last visited February 5, 2010)
(according to a 2007 update, only Exxon remains in the top thirty of global entities ranked
by wealth).
245. See SOC’Y FOR APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY, WHO PAYS THE PRICE? THE
SOCIOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 206 (Barbara Rose Johnston ed., Island
Press 1994).
246. John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, §
23, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2005).
247.
Scott Holwick, Transnational Corporate Behavior and its Disparate and Unjust
Effects on the Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v.
Texaco, A Case Study, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 183, 192 (2000).
248. See id.
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workers’ rights, environmental impact, or taxes, the host government operates under the ever-present implicit threat that the MNC will seek out a
more favorable country for its operation.249 This practice is one example of
how host countries fail in attempting to regulate MNCs’ behavior.
The interrelatedness of corporate desires and host governments’ ability
to regulate is complex, especially in extractive industries, such as mining
for oil or fossil fuels.250 An example of this allegedly occurred in Papua
New Guinea when Rio Tinto asked for government forces to protect its
mining site.251 The presence of government military forces resulted in a
secessionist movement, started a civil war that lasted several years, and
ended with a military blockade that cut off citizens from medical care and
food.252 For a poor country such as Papua New Guinea, the lucrative business of hosting a MNC often takes precedence over the protection of citizens. Although this is not the ideal situation, and typically host states
should bear the primary responsibility, it is the current state of relations. As
a result, reliance on host governments to protect their own citizens has not
provided sufficient protection.253
A more realistic way of protecting citizens from corporate abuse is to
increase the availability of judicial remedies for such abuse.254 “States
should strengthen [their ability] to hear complaints and enforce remedies
against all corporations . . . .”255 States have the responsibility to “address
obstacles to access to justice, including for foreign plaintiffs—especially
where alleged abuses reach the level of widespread and systematic human
rights violations.”256 The United States has the responsibility to provide
judicial remedy for abuses that occur at the hands of corporations who are
based or conduct business in the United States, and already has the appropriate legislation in place to do just that through the TVPA and ATCA.
It is in the best interest of the United States to regulate corporations
that do business within its jurisdiction. As the D.C. Circuit eloquently
stated, “Ultimately, the United States, the leader of the free world, has an
overarching, vital interest in the safety, prosperity, and consequences of the
249. See Jennifer Green & Beth Stephens, Human Rights Litigation and the Corporate Accountability Movement, Sept. 2008, http://www.reports-and-materials.org/JenniferGreen-and-Beth-Stephens-commentary.pdf.
250. See Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the
Extractive and Manufacturing Indsutries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 327, 352 (2008).
251.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
252. Id.
253.
Carlos Lopez, Business, Human Rights, and Accountability, Aug. 2008,
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Carlos-Lopez-commentary.pdf.
254. See id.
255.
Holly J. Gregory Weil, 1694 PLI/Corp 185, 211 (Sep. 22, 2008).
256. Id.
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behavior of its citizens, particularly its super-corporations conducting business in one or more foreign countries.”257 Corporations have shareholders
and consumers in the United States who have the power to influence corporate behavior through economic mechanisms. However, shareholders rarely
know enough about what is taking place in developing countries in order to
make educated and influential decisions.258 By allowing victims to file suit
in the United States—the location of the corporation’s base or activity, the
location of the corporation’s shareholders, and the location of the corporation’s consumers—corporations can be publicly held accountable, and as a
result their behavior will be influenced.259
Furthermore, as corporations begin to lose motions to dismiss and cases begin to go to trial, corporations will settle or victims will get damage
awards. As a result, it will become more profitable for corporations to abide
by human rights laws, and avoid the financial judgments or settlements,
than to break the law and use forced labor or torture.260 “Indeed, the court of
global public opinion is a most potent deterrent for corporations and individuals in the global game, enforced by the possibility of a publicity disaster brought by a (perhaps even, in the end, ineffective) tort claim for violation of international standards of avoiding harm.”261 If the United States
refuses to allow suits to be brought against corporations under the TVPA,
then the economic balancing, accomplished when victims receive compensation through American courts, cannot take place, and the gap in governance over the regulation of multinational corporations will remain.
The TVPA should be interpreted to include corporations within its
scope, because it would resolve the existing gap in governance regarding
the regulation of MNCs and prevent future human rights abuses. Relying on
regulation at the host country level is futile because corporations dominate
those governments, set international and domestic political agendas, and
often have a corporate structure that outlasts the government of the host
country.262 Furthermore, the current structure allows corporations to simply
switch host countries when one host country puts pressure on the MNC to
behave responsibly—this essentially leaves host countries powerless to
257.
Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss Claims under the TVPA at 3, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006) (No. A.01-1357) 2006 WL
516744.
258. See Stathis Banakas, A Global Concept of Justice--Dream or Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today's World, 67 LA.
L. REV. 1021, 1037 (2007).
259.
Lopez, supra note 253.
260. See Audrey Koecher, Note, Corporate Accountability for Environmental Human
Rights Abuse in Developing Nations: Making the Case for Punitive Damages under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 151 (2007).
261.
Banakas, supra note 258, at 1036.
262.
Green & Stephens, supra note 249.
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regulate MNCs.263 The most effective way to regulate right now is to increase the availability for judicial remedies in the countries where the corporations are based, such as the United States. Such a reading of the TVPA
increases access to judicial remedies while advancing the intent of Congress
and compliance with international law.
2. American Obligation under International Law
Interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act to apply to corporations
is consistent with international law that requires that victims have access to
judicial remedies when their human rights are violated.264 Although some
corporate defendants have argued that corporate abuse does not fall under
international law because the abuse is a purely private act that is not currently governed by international law,265 this interpretation is incorrect because the TVPA requires that the act occur under the color of law.266 The
color of law requirement moves the corporate action from a purely private
action to a state one, which is governed by international law. It therefore
requires the United States to provide judicial remedy as a signatory to international treaties such as the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the
International Covenant Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).267
The CAT requires signatory countries to “take such measures as may
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over [such] offences”268 in cases
where “the alleged offender”269 is present “in any territory under its jurisdiction.”270 Excluding corporations from the purview of the TVPA can
leave the United States in violation of its obligations under the CAT. Limiting the construction of “individual” to singular human beings limits jurisdiction over offenses of torture—a measure that the Convention Against
Torture strictly prohibits.271

263. See id.
264. See Lopez, supra note 253.
265.
Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the
Plaintiffs' Claims Under the Torture Victim Protection Act at 2, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.,
557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C99-02506 SI), 2006 WL 1050620.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
267. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (1988); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, ¶ 3(d),
Mar. 23, 1976, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
268.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 5, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20 (1988).
269. Id. at art. 5(b).
270. Id.
271. See id. at art. 16.
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The predecessor to the CAT was the United Nations Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Declaration”),
which the Filártiga court relied upon.272 The Declaration, which was passed
by the General Assembly, requires states to “take effective measures to
prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from being practiced within its jurisdiction.”273 Thus, “[w]here it is
proved that an act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment has been committed by or at the instigation of a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress and compensation in accordance
with national law.”274
Both of these provisions require the United States to take action to
prevent torture and to compensate victims when torture occurs. The Declaration does not specifically state how to “prevent torture” from occurring,
but only requires it to be prevented. Civil suits may be the best way to prevent corporate torture because civil suits speak in corporate terms—namely,
monetarily.275 The United States has an obligation to effectively prevent
torture. If the most effective prevention is through civil suits, the U.S.
should allow those suits. Suits brought under the TVPA also satisfy the dual
functions that the Declaration and CAT call for: they would prevent torture
through deterrence and provide compensation. In failing to enact a system
of prevention that addresses and compensates torture victims by the hands
of corporations, the United States is failing to meet its obligations under
both the Declaration and the CAT. By using the preexisting law, such as the
TVPA and CAT, the United States can fulfill its treaty obligations in regards to torture.
Finally, allowing civil suits through the federal court system will not
overburden the system. The United States federal court system is very capable of adjudicating the civil suits deriving from egregious abuse of international law, such as the CAT or ICCPR, as these claims are analogous to
civil deprivations in the United States.276 The U.S. has relied upon the federal court system to uphold its obligations under international law to provide judicial remedy and should continue to do so in the context of the CAT
and the TVPA—especially considering that the CAT explicitly requires
272.
Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
273.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, art. 4,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess. Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9, 1975), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/declarationcat.htm.
274. Id. at art. 11.
275. See Banakas, supra note 258.
276. See Brief for Human Rights Watch as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Doe v. Karadzic, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2001) No. 93-0878.
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signatory parties to provide a judicial remedy.277 By precluding the federal
court system from hearing claims of corporate abuse, the United States is
failing to uphold its obligation under international law.
The Senate report accompanying the TVPA explicitly acknowledged
the role of the TVPA in fulfilling American obligation under international
law.278
This legislation will carry out the intent of the Convention
Against Torture . . . . The convention obligates state parties
to adopt measures to ensure that torturers within their territories are held legally accountable for their acts. This legislation will do precisely that—by making sure that torturers
and death squads will no longer have a safe haven in the
United States.279
The Senate recognized that the Torture Victim Protection Act fulfills a necessary role under international law. Failure to interpret the TVPA as applicable to corporations leaves a large gap in that obligation and provides the
very safe haven Congress was attempting to eradicate.280
The Torture Victim Protection Act should be interpreted as applicable
to corporations because this interpretation is consistent with legislative history and fills a dangerous governance gap in the law governing corporate
atrocities. Furthermore, failure to interpret the TVPA as applicable to corporations leaves the United States in violation of its obligation under the
Convention Against Torture281 and the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.282
V. CONCLUSION
The Torture Victim Protection Act was enacted by Congress to provide comfort to the hundreds of victims who are subjected to torture around
the world.283 Congress’s goal is laudable; however, it is ineffective if the
277. See id.
278. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, at 91,
U.N. GAOR 30th Sess. Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9, 1975) (quoting John Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008)).
283. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3.
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TVPA is not applied to torture committed at the hands of corporations. The
fact that cases are being filed in the United States against corporations
should be the “canary in the coal mine signaling that all is not well” in the
world.284
Encompassing corporations in the definition of “individual” in the
TVPA provides the sought-after relief to victims of corporate torture. This
argument is supported by the legislative history, case law, and policy implications. As Senator Kennedy stated in passing the TVPA, “we have an obligation to make our courts accessible to . . . victims to the maximum extent
that the Constitution allows to assure that torturers feel the full weight of
international law.”285 Interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act any
other way than to hold corporations liable for their actions abroad is to limit
victims’ access to remedies and to relieve corporations of the weight of
international and domestic law, and allows corporations to continue to
cause destruction in the lives of workers and citizens.
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